COMMENT
NEW JERSEY CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS:
A RESPONSIBLE APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
As the national divorce rate increases,' the number of children
involved in a divorce parallels this growth. 2 Because divorce does not
end a child's relationship with other family members, but simply
alters the family relationships, 3 a pressing issue arises as to what
becomes of these children in a post-divorce setting after the family
structure has been redefined.
In recent years numerous changes have affected the family. The
rise in divorce rates and an increase in working mothers are just some
of the changes which have altered the traditional husband-providerwife-homemaker family. 4 Social and economic forces have changed
the status of women, resulting in many women giving up their role as

Statistics indicate that the national divorce rate per 1000 total population was 5.2 in 1978
(1,130,000) and 5.0 in 1977 (1,091,000). DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs., 3 VITAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE table 2-1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
VITAL STATISTICS]. This was a + 4.0 percent change in the rate of divorces. Id. A comparison
with the 1968 statistics even more dramatically illustrates the rising rate; 2.9 per 1000 total
population (584,000) divorces occurred in that year. Id. Although the rate of divorces in New
Jersey is not as high as the national average, the increase in divorces is still evident. See id. table
2-2. In 1978 the divorce rate in New Jersey was 3.6 per 1000 total population (26,575) as
compared to a rate of 2.8 in 1977 (20,493). Id.
Estimates show that approximately 18.1 per 1000 children under 18 years of age were
involved in a divorce in 1978. Id. table 2-8. This statistic translates into approximately 1,147,000
children being affected by a divorce. Id. The corresponding statistics were 17.0 for 1977
(1,095,000) and 11.1 for 1968 (784,000). Id.
3 Abarbanel, Shared ParentingAfter Separation and Divorce: A Study of joint Custody, 49
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 320, 321 (1979).
4 It is estimated that in 1970 25,554,000 children under 18 years of age had mothers in the
labor force. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, PERSPECTIVES ON WORKING
WOMEN: A DATABOOK table 30 (1980). This was approximately 40% of the total child population. See id. By 1979, the figures indicated that roughly 30,105,000 children had mothers
working; id., i.e., approximately 51% of all children under 18 years of age. See id. The New
Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Matrimonial Litigation [hereinafter the Pashman Committee] recognized the family structural changes and noted the complications caused in the child
custody area. SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON MATRIMONIAL LITIGATION, PHASE Two, FINAL
REPORT 6 (June 10, 1981), reprintedas a supplement to 108 N.J.L.J. 41 (July 16, 1981) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. For further discussion on societal changes, see infra notes 5 & 6 and
accompanying text.
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primary caretaker of the children. 5 In response, fathers have become
more actively involved in parenting. Simply stated, when the wife is
employed outside the home, the husband becomes more involved in
household chores and child care." As a result of these societal changes,
the long-standing presumption that the mother should be awarded
custody7 should not stand unquestioned. 8 Joint custody has been her-

' In March 1975 nearly two-thirds of mothers with preschool children worked full time.
Hayghe, Families and the Rise of Working Wives-An Overview, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 12, 16
(1976). Shifts in labor patterns were attributed to the onset of high inflation and a decline in the
birth rate during the 1960's. Id. at 13.
Several major factors are responsible for the increase in the number of working women.
Kreps & Leaper, Home Work, Market Work and the Allocation of Time, in WOMEN AND TH1E
AMERICAN ECONOMY: A LOOK TO THE 1980s, at 61, 63 (j. Kreps ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Home Work]. The Second World War opened the job market to women who remained in the
labor force after the War. Id. at 63-64. More service positions, traditionally women-oriented,
were available. Id. at 64. Improved household technology gave women more time to work
outside the home. Id. at 64-65. Finally, the decline in the birth rate meant women spent a
smaller proportion of their lifetime caring for children and more time was available to enter the
labor market. Id. at 65.
The Women's Movement was another factor in opening positions for women. Miller, Joint
Custody, 13 FAM. L. Q. 345, 365 (1979). One author believes that the movement accentuated
changes which had occurred in previous years. Chafe, Looking Backward in Order to Look
Forward: Women, Work and Social Values in America, in WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A LooK TO THE 1980s, at 6, 23 U. Kreps ed. 1976). "Ever since World War 11 the reality of
women's 'place' had ceased to conform to the stereotype." Id. (emphasis in original). For a
discussion as to effects of the women's movement see generally Friedan, Twenty Years After The
Feminist Mystique, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 35.
Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 KY. L.J. 271, 278 (citing S. Greenwald, Family Responsibilities
of Selected Working Mothers (1959) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University));
see also Benedek & Benedek, Joint Custody: Solution or Illusion?, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1540,
1540 (1979) (traditional roles of father and mother are no longer as distinct as in past); Greif,
Fathers, Children and Joint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 311, 311 (1979) (fathers are
becoming more involved in family life with father-child relationships being redefined); Taussig
& Carpenter, Joint Custody, 56 N.D.L. REV. 223,227 (1977) (changes in American culture
account for increased leisure time; many fathers use time for child care).
I It has been estimated that mothers receive sole custody of their children in over 90% of
divorce proceedings. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 36 (1978); see also Sex
Discrimination in Marriage and Family Law: Public Hearing Before Commission on Sex Discrimination in the Statutes, 198th Leg., 1st Sess. 17 (1980) (statement of Howard Danzig) ("nine
out of every ten custody cases results in the mother getting custody"); accord id. at 25 (statement
of Anthony Gil) (custody awarded to mother "probably somewhere in the area of 95%").
8 In custody determinations judicial preference for the father or mother has been the result
of prevailing attitudes regarding parental roles and economic circumstances. Foster & Freed,
Joint Custody: A Viable Alternative?, 15 TRIAL 26, 27 (1979). Industrialization and urbanization
caused men to work outside the home and women inside the home. Home Work, supra note 5, at
61. This pattern established the mother as the primary caretaker of the children. Miller, supra
note 5, at 352. The fixing of roles caused judicial recognition of a mother's right to custody,
resulting in the tender years presumption. Bratt, supra note 6, at 281; see infra notes 50-52 and
accompanying text. Since family roles are again changing it has been suggested that custody
decisions should reflect these changes. Bratt, supra note 6, at 279-81.
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aided as the solution for both parents" as well as children after a
divorce.' 0 Before accepting this alternative as a panacea, however, the
custody issue must be explored in the context of the child's best interests." This Comment will discuss the history of custody determinations as well as the current state of the law in New Jersey. Emphasis
will be placed on the practicality of joint custody in light of pending
2
legislation in the New Jersey Senate.1
Joint Custody
The phrase "joint custody" lacks a definitive meaning.' 3 In essence, joint custody is "a cooperative venture 14 with an unlimited
potential to assume various forms.15 Complications may develop be-

g One commentator contends that parents have a fundamental right of parental autonomy
which is constitutionally protected; a presumption of joint custody logically flows from this
right. Canacakos, Joint Custody As A Fundamental Right, 23 Afuz. L. REV. 785 (1981). The
fundamental right of parents to the companionship and care of their child has been recognized as
constitutionally protected by at least one New Jersey court. See In re J. S. & C., 129 N.J. Super.
486, 489, 324 A.2d 90, 92 (Ch. 1974) ("right may not be restricted without a showing that the
parent's activities may tend to impair the emotional or physical health of the child"), af'd, 142
N.J. Super. 499, 362 A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1976). But cf. DeVita v. DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120,
128, 366 A.2d 1350, 1354 (App. Div. 1976) ("personal wishes of a parent do not govern the
conditions of custody").
10 See generally M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 7; Bratt, supra note 6; Folberg &
Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 523 (1979); Taussig
& Carpenter, supra note 6; Comment, Joint Custody Awards: Toward the Development of
Judicial Standards, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 105 (1979).
11 Gardner, Joint Custody Is Not For Everyone, 5 FAM. Aovoc. 7, 8 (1982). The "best
interests of the child" standard is recognized in a majority of the states either by case law or
statute. Miller, supra note 5, at 354. In addition, the standard appears in § 402 of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197 (1979). The
classic statement as enunciated in New Jersey can be found in Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525,
122 A.2d 593 (1956). "Our law in a cause involving the custody of a minor child is that the
paramount consideration is the safety, happiness, physical, mental and moral welfare of the
child." Id. at 536, 122 A.2d at 598. It has been claimed, however, that the best interests standard
"is merely a cloak for judicial discretion and intuition." Miller, supra note 5, at 354.
12 S. 598, 200th Leg., 1st Sess. (1982). See infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
'1 Berman & Kirsh, Definitions of Joint Custody, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 2, 2 (1982); see also
Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1540. Joint custody is also referred to as shared custody, cocustody or co-parenting. Folberg & Graham, supra note 10, at 528. A variety of terms has been
confused with joint custody. See Miller, supra note 5, at 360. Among them is the concept of
divided or alternating custody which is the periodic change of physical custody in each parent
with reciprocal visiting privileges. Folberg & Graham, supra note 10, at 526. The parent with
whom the child lives has complete control over the child. Id. Another concept, split custody,
does not involve any sharing. Bratt, supra note 6, at 283. One parent has sole custody of one or
more children, while the other parent receives sole custody of the remaining children. Id.
Confusion has been furthered by the use of these terms interchangeably. Folberg & Graham,
supra note 10, at 525.
14 Carroll, Ducking the Real Issues of Joint Custody, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 18, 20 (1982).
15 See id.; For examples of joint custody arrangements see M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra
note 7, at 123-48.
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cause the parents seeking joint custody, as well as the judge hearing
the matter, have divergent expectations and objectives. 16 Differing
views as to whether the arrangement is advantageous or harmful
creates additional problems when considering a joint disposition.'"
An enumeration of the beneficial aspects of the joint custody
arrangement appears in numerous articles 8 and in at least two
books. '9 Advocates contend that a joint custody disposition results in a
reorganization of the family structure 20 in a manner which most
closely resembles the pre-divorce situation. 2 ' Shared custody, with its
continuing contact between the child and both parents, enhances the
child's emotional stability; 22 the child receives love, care, attention
and guidance from both parents. 23 Furthermore, retaining a meaningful relationship with both parents may ease the traumatic experience
of the parental divorce. 24 Proponents also claim that parents are more
25
effective in carrying out their responsibilities toward the child;
mothers are not overburdened by sole custody 26 and fathers are not

"6

Divorced parents contemplating joint custody have been found to manifest different
perspectives, objectives and expectations. See Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1540.
11 See infra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Abarbanel, supra note 3; Bratt, supra note 6; Gardner, supra note 11; Greif,
supra note 6; Miller, supra note 5, at 361-66; Comment, Joint Custody-An Alternative for
Louisiana, 7 S.U.L. REV. 127 (1980).
11 See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 7; C. WARE, SHARING PARENTHOOD AFTER
DIVORCE (1982), excerpts reprintedin Sunday Record, Feb. 13, 1983, at Fll, col. 2, and The
Record, Feb. 14-17, 1983.
20

M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD,

supra note 7, at 104.

21 Gardner, supra note 11, at 7; see also Miller, supra note 5, at 363.
22 Bratt, supra note 6, at 298. The child's sense of security is important to his or her
emotional stability. Id. The child's knowledge that he or she has a home with both parents and is
wanted by both parents creates a sense of security. Id. In addition, one study has shown that the
psychological relationship of parent and child is emotionally important to the child. llfield,
Ilfield & Alexander, Does Joint Custody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data of Relitigation,
139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62, 63 (1982) (citing J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVINC THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980)) [hereinafter cited as Ilfield]. For

these reasons, the best interests of the child, in the long run, are best served by continuing contact
with both parents. See id.
23 Miller, supra note 5, at 362; see also Bratt, supra note 6, at 300-01. Involvement with two
parents provides psychological advantages and diminishes the sense of loss suffered by the child.
Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1541; see also Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 325.
2'4 Comment, supra note 18, at 130; cf. Bratt, supra note 6, at 303 (trauma eased by lack of
custody fight).
25 E.g., Bratt, supra note 6, at 301.
26 Studies indicate that mothers who are awarded sole custody are overburdened by the
demands of single parenthood. Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 321. Divorced mothers must cope
with increased responsibility for their children at a time when discipline problems may increase
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relegated to a visitor status.27 Finally, the flexibility of the arrangement allows for adaptation to the evolving needs of all family mem28
bers.
Commentators critical of joint custody are not as numerous as
proponents of the arrangement. 29 Critics believe joint custody creates
instability in a child's life. 30 Disciplinary problems may arise because
two sources of authority exist. 31 It is contended that parents who could
not sustain a marriage will not be able to cooperate in childrearing
matters or parental decisions. 32 The necessity for continuing contact
between the divorced parents may intensify an already stressful situation.

33

The relative merits of joint custody are still unknown. 34 Therefore, the viability of this alternative arrangement will only be known
after both the long and short term effects of custody determinations
have been more fully researched.

35

because of the emotional turmoil the mother and children are experiencing. See M. ROMAN & W.
HADDAD, supra note 7, at 73-80.
27 The divorced father experiences many problems, see M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note
7, at 80-83, with the most significant being the sense of loss suffered when separated from his
children. Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 321. Typically, the non-custodial father is limited to
visitation time with his children which is often spent entertaining rather than using the allotted
time to develop a relationship. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 7, at 74-75; see also
Greif, supra note 6, at 311. One study indicates that joint custody results in increased involvement and more effective fathering. Id. at 313.
28 Miller, supra note 5, at 361. Although sole custody may be modified, the family must
resort to the courts. Id. at 362. In a joint custody situation where the parents are responsible for
living arrangements, modification is simplified. Id.
29 A 1973 book, J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973), is frequently cited to support arguments which disfavor joint custody. Folberg &
Graham, supra note 10, at 557. Although joint custody is not mentioned in the book, the authors'
premise is that a child of divorce should have only one "psychological parent." Id. at 557-59.
This is the antithesis of the joint custody concept.
30 E.g. Miller, supra note 5, at 366. Movement between two homes where a child is subject
to different rules, disciplinary procedures and parenting methods may result in instability.
Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1541.
31 Miller, supra note 5, at 367. Commentators believe children may view shared custody as
an opportunity to manipulate their parents. Id. at 367-68; Gardner, supra note 11, at 7.
32 Miller, supra note 5, at 367.
33 Id.
" The lack of data concerning the effects of joint custody is well recognized. Ilfield, supra
note 22, at 62. Advocates claim that skepticism is based on conjecture, but the same can be said
of their position. Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1542. The lack of research in the area is
not owing to the lack of shared custody arrangements in practice. See Bratt, supra note 6, at 282.
However, reasons for the shortage of studies are not apparent. The various arrangements of
shared custody are discussed supra note 13.
35 See Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 328; see also Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1542.
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II.

HISTORY OF CUSTODY IN NEW JERSEY

A. Statutory History
Prior to the nineteenth century, custody of a child was customarily awarded to the father. 36 The common-law rule granted the superior right of custody to the father as head of the family 3V based on the
theory that the father had a property interest in the child's services. 38
Although the common-law rule was followed in New Jersey, 3 it
was early recognized that the father's legal right to custody was not an
absolute property right. 40 For example, the father could be denied
custody if he was found to be unfit. 4' Moreover, an 1860 New Jersey
statute 42 concerning separation provided that children "within the age
of seven years" be placed with the mother. 43 This maternal preference

11M.

ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 7, at 22-23.

31 State v. Baird, 21 N.J. Eq. 384, 388 (Ct. Err. & App. 1869); Clemens v. Clemens, 20 N.J.
Super. 383, 390, 90 A.2d 72, 75 (App. Div. 1952); State v. Stigall, 22 N.J.L. 286, 288 (Sup. Ct.
1849).
38 Taussig & Carpenter, supra note 6, at 244; see also State v. Baird, 21 N.J. Eq. 384, 399
(Ct. Err. & App. 1869) (Dalrimple, J., dissenting) (father's right to services and society of
daughter is no less than right to those of son). Contra Bennet v. Bennet, 13 N.J. Eq. 114, 118
(Ch. 1860) (father has no property right in children, but rather "a qualified right to the services
of the child").
31 See cases cited supra note 37.
40 See Bennet v. Bennet, 13 N.J. Eq. 114, 118 (Ch. 1860); Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J.
Eq. 517, 519, 128 A. 254, 255 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925) (stating that right of father to custody was
"'a trust reposed in the father by the state, as parenspatriae for the welfare of the infant"). For a
discussion on parens patriae, see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
4' State v. Baird, 18 N.J. Eq. 194, 197-98 (Ch. 1867) (father may be unfit because of
"notorious grossly immoral character or great impurity of life"), rev'd on other grounds, 21 N.J.
Eq. 384 (Ct. Err. & App. 1869); see also State v. Stigall, 22 N.J.L. 286, 289 (Sup. Ct. 1849)
(children's exposure "to cruelty or gross corruption, immoral principles or habits" or inability of
father to provide for and support children).
42 Act of Mar. 2, 1860, ch. 167, 1860 N.J. Laws 437.
41 Id. The relevant text of the statute reads:
That when any husband and wife shall live in a state of separation, without being
divorced, and shall have any minor child or children of the marriage, the chancellor,
the supreme court of this state, or any justice of the said supreme court, upon the
said child or children being brought before them upon habeas corpus, shall make an
order for the access of the mother to her infant child or children at such times and
under such circumstances as they may direct; and if the said child or children be
within the age of seven years shall make an order that the said child or children be
delivered to and remain in the custody of the mother until said child or children shall
attain such age, unless said mother shall be of such character and habits as to render
her an improper guardian for said child or children.
Id. (emphasis added).
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was known as the tender years presumption. 44 Thus, the statute, by
taking away the court's discretion in certain circumstances, further
45
eroded the father's paramount right to custody.
In 1871, the New Jersey Legislature enacted a statute declaring
the rights of both parents to be equal in a custody proceeding, 46 with
the happiness and welfare of the child being the determinative standard. 47 The apparent purpose of this statute was to abolish both the
father's common-law superior right to custody and the mother's statu49
tory tender years presumption. 48 The father's rights were abolished;
50
however, the tender years presumption persisted primarily because
of the belief that a young child's best interest necessitated a mother's
care. 51 In fact, as late as 1979 the tender years presumption had
survived, with one court noting that "[a]lthough our personal views
may be contrary, the Supreme Court has still not displaced the doctrine that custody of a young child 'is normally placed with the
mother, if fit.' "52

See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
11 Bennet v. Bennet, 13 N.J. Eq. 114, 116 (Ch. 1860).
46 Act of Feb. 21, 1871, ch. 48, 1871 N.J. Laws 15, 16, § 6. The pertinent language states:
That in making an order or decree relative to the custody of the children pending a
controversy between their parents, or in regard to their final possession, the rights of
both parents, in the absence of misconduct, shall be held to be equal, and the
happiness and welfare of the children shall determine the custody or possession.
Id. at 16.
47 Id.
48 Although this is the apparent purpose of the statute according to a literal reading, one
court stated that the only effect of the statute was to give direction to the Chancellor in equitable
proceedings. Landis v. Landis, 39 N.J.L. 274, 276-78 (Sup. Ct. 1877). The 1860 statute remained in effect in technical and legal proceedings. Id. at 277.
49 English v. English, 32 N.J. Eq. 738, 743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1880) (best interests of child
outweigh either parent's claim of custody rights).
50 In Dixon v. Dixon, 71 N.J. Eq. 281 (Ct. Err. & App. 1906), the court awarded custody to
the mother because the children were of tender years. Id. at 282; see also Fiore v. Fiore, 49 N.J.
Super. 219, 225-26, 139 A.2d 414, 417 (App. Div.) (law recognizes mother as natural custodian),
certif. denied, 28 N.J. 59, 145 A.2d 168 (1958); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 38 N.J. Super. 120, 126,
118 A.2d 89, 92 (App. Div. 1955) (customary to award mother custody of child of tender years);
Wojnarowicz v. Wojnarowicz, 48 N.J. Super. 349, 353, 137 A.2d 618, 620 (Ch. 1958) ("... the
courts, in recognition of an inexorable natural force, customarily award the custody of a child of
tender years to its mother . . .").
11 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 68 N.J. Super. 223, 233, 172 A.2d 97, 102 (App. Div.) ("The
rationale is that the mother will take better and more expert care of such a child than the
father."), certif. denied, 36 N.J. 143, 174 A.2d 926 (1961); Seitz v. Seitz, 1 N.J. Super. 234, 240,
64 A.2d 87, 89 (App. Div. 1949) (mother does not receive custody of tender years children
because of a rule of law; rather, mother will take better and more expert care); Wojnarowicz v.
Wojnarowicz, 48 N.J. Super. 349, 353, 137 A.2d 618, 620 (Ch. 1958) ("child's well being is
better safeguarded in the hands of the mother.")
52 M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 435, 404 A.2d 1256, 1261 (App. Div. 1979) (quoting
Esposito v. Esposito, 41 N.J. 143, 154, 195 A.2d 295, 296 (1963)).
44
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The 1871 statute remained intact 3 until a 1921 amendment
added language which "equally charged" both parents with the child's
"care, nurture, education and welfare."'5 4 In determining which parent should receive custody, the child's happiness and welfare remained the standard. 55 The statute currently in effect is identical to
the 1921 amendment in its relevant portion.56 Although the statute
does not explicitly authorize any specific type of custody arrangement, 57 its language has been interpreted as a strong indication that
joint custody is a permitted disposition.

58

The statutory grants of judicial authority to determine custody 59
supplement the inherent parenspatriaejurisdiction of the courts60 and

53
54

See Act of Apr. 2, 1902, ch. 92, 1902 N.J. Laws 259, 264, § 9.
Act of Mar. 31, 1921, ch. 107, 1921 N.J. Laws 204, 205, § 2. The applicable amendment

states:
In making an order or decree relative to the custody of the children pending a
controversy between their parents, or in regard to their final possession, the rights of
both parents, in the absence of misconduct, shall be held to be equal, and they shall
be equally charged with their care, nurture, education and welfare, and the happiness and welfare of the children shall determine the custody or possession.
Id. at 205.
55 Id.
56 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1976) with Act of March 31, 1921, ch. 107, 1921
N.J. Laws 204, 205, § 2.
57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1976) is clearly related to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:34-23
(West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 485, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (1981). N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983) provides in pertinent part: "[T]he court
may make such order. . . as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children, or
any of them, as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit,
reasonable and just ..
" N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). These
closely related statutes allow the judiciary extensive leeway in making custody decisions. Beck v.
Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 485, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (1981).
58 See Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 488, 432 A.2d 63, 66 (1981) (endorsing joint custody;
refusing to establish presumption for any one type of custody); cf. Miller, supra note 5, at 380.
But see Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 502, 432 A.2d 63, 73 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) ("I do not
consider [joint custody] 'the preferred disposition' in custody cases as the majority opinion,
despite some restrictive language, seems to suggest."). See infra notes 101-29 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Beck case.
" See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4
(West 1976).
'0 Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 535, 122 A.2d 593, 598 (1956); Salmon v. Salmon, 88
N.J. Super. 291, 305, 212 A.2d 171, 178 (App. Div. 1965); Parenspatriae jurisdiction is more
extensive than the statutory grant of jurisdiction. Clemens v. Clemens, 20 N.J. Super. 383, 38990, 90 A.2d 72, 75 (App. Div. 1952). This jurisdiction allows the state to determine custody of
infants within the state regardless of the parents' domicile. Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525,
535, 122 A.2d 593, 598 (1956); Hachez v. Hachez, 124 N.J. Eq. 442, 448, 1 A.2d 845, 847
(1938). Parens patriae is "the equitable power of the state to protect children and act in their
" Boskey & McCue, Alternative Standardsfor the
welfare according to their best interests ..
Termination of ParentalRights, 9 SEON HALL L. REV. 1, 18 (1978). For a discussion of the
possible origins of this jurisdiction see id. at 18 n. 119.
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result in considerable judicial discretion in this sensitive area. 61 The
traditional best interests of the child standard is not a precise legal
standard; complex social, psychological and economic factors must be
evaluated to determine the child's best interests. 62 Judges understandably often lack training in the many disciplines relative to custody
determinations, 3 thus rendering the decision-making process quite
formidable in most instances.6 4 As a result, the judiciary finds itself
acting in an extralegal as well as a legal capacity in a custody determination. 6

B. Case Law
Shared custody is not a recent phenomenon.6 6 Although not in a
traditional divorce setting, 67 New Jersey's highest court ordered a
divided arrangement 68 as early as 1925.69 In Lippincott v. Lippincott7 0 an orphaned child was the subject of a custody dispute. 7' Four

years prior to his death, the father had executed papers appointing the
paternal grandparents as the boy's guardian in the event of the father's
death. 72 After the father died, the maternal grandparents sought custody of the young boy. 73 The court, exercising its parens patriae

0lThe legislature intended to give the "courts wide latitude to fashion creative remedies .. " Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 485, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (1981); see also State v. Stigall, 22
N.J.L. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1849). "The discretion is pretty broad, and perhaps extending with the
improvements and refinements of the age, yet it is not arbitrary, but based on sound principles,
yet, like all other discretionary proceedings, will take its hue from the officer exercising it." Id. at
289.
62 Bratt, supra note 6, at 271. The importance and relationship of these factors is not known.
Id. For a discussion on the use of psychology in custody determinations, see generally Okpaku,
Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1117 (1976).
63 Bratt, supra note 6, at 272.
64 Willis v. Willis, 118 A. 333, 333 (Ch. 1922) ("Probably the most difficult questions that
come before this court are questions of this nature"); State v. Baird, 21 N.J. Eq. 384, 388 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1869) ("the duty of arbitrating ... is felt to be one of painful responsibility").
65 Bratt, supra note 6, at 271-73, 296.
66 See Bratt, supra note 6, at 282. The various arrangements of shared custody are discussed
supra note 13.
67 In Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq. 517, 518, 128 A. 254, 254-55 (Ct. Err. & App.
1925), the custody dispute was between maternal and paternal grandparents.
68 Divided custody is an arrangement whereby the child lives with each custodian for part of
the year. Bratt, supra note 6, at 283.
66 Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq. 517, 128 A. 254 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925).
70 Id.

Id. at 517-18, 128 A. at 254.
Id. at 518, 128 A. at 254.
73 Id. The maternal grandparents later amended their petition requesting only partial custody. Id. at 518, 128 A. at 255.
71
72
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jurisdiction,7 4 ordered that it was in the child's best interests to be
placed in the maternal grandparents' custody for two months of each
year.75
A later case 76 similarly illustrates judicial awareness of the benefits inherent in continued attachment to both parents. 77 Although the
father had been awarded partial custody 78 of his son, the mother
began to refuse the father his weekend visitation privileges. 79 The
father resorted to the courts to enforce his privileges, but an Advisory
Master denied him all custody and visitation rights.8 0 The denial was
based on the child's agitation and resistance when his father called for
him. 8 ' The appellate court determined that the child's adverse reaction to the father was the product of the mother's conduct. 82 In
reversing and remanding to the chancery division, the appellate division suggested that the father's partial custody be increased rather
83
than decreased.
4
Joint custody was first squarely addressed in Mayer v. Mayer"
85
dispute.
in
was
13,
and
11
where the custody of two children, ages
The mother, who had recently undergone a cancer operation and had
continuing health problems, 6 requested permission of the court to

74 Id. at 519-21, 128 A. at 255-56. The father's appointment of a guardian could not
determine the custody disposition. Id. at 521-22, 128 A. at 256. The determination had to be
made by the court based on the child's best interests. Id. at 522, 128 A. at 256. See supra note 60
for a discussion of parens patriae.
11 97 N.J. Eq. at 522, 128 A. at 256.
71 Turney v. Nooney, 5 N.J. Super. 392, 69 A.2d 342 (App. Div. 1949).
77 Id. at 397-98, 69 A.2d at 344-45. For a discussion of these benefits see supra notes 18-28
and accompanying text.
71 The court did not define partial custody; however, the specific details of the arrangement
allowed the father custody every weekend from Saturday morning until Sunday morning as well
as two weeks in July and two weeks in August every year. Turney v. Nooney, 5 N.J. Super. 392,
394, 69 A.2d 342, 343 (App. Div. 1949). The case does not mention whether a specific provision
was made for legal custody during the time the child was in the care of the father.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 394-95, 69 A.2d at 343.
81 Id. at 395, 69 A.2d at 343. There was adequate evidence that the child's disturbance was
only an initial reaction to the father. Id. Once the child was left with the father the reaction
subsided and the child appeared happy. Id. at 395-96, 69 A.2d at 343.
" Id. at 397-98, 69 A.2d at 344-45. The mother had an obligation to enhance the relationship between the child and father-an obligation which she had failed to fulfill. Id. at 397, 69
A.2d at 344.
83 Id. at 398, 69 A.2d at 345.
84 150 N.J. Super. 556, 376 A.2d 214 (Ch. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 180 N.J. Super.

164, 434 A.2d 614 (App. Div. 1981). The court commented that joint custody had never been
examined in a reported New Jersey decision. Id. at 561, 376 A.2d at 217.
85 Id. at 559, 376 A.2d at 216. The children were in the mother's custody at the time of the
trial. Id.
8" Id. The mother was under medical and psychiatric care. Id.
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move with the children to Pittsburgh to be near her parents.8 7 During
settlement negotiations the trial judge suggested joint custody as an
appropriate alternative under the circumstances.88 In trial summations the mother requested that if joint custody were ordered one
parent be named sole legal custodian. 89 The father, however, desired
a joint custody disposition.9"
The Mayer court found judicial authority to permit shared forms
of custody in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23, which allowed "fit, reasonable and just" custody awards. 9' After reviewing the "best interests"
standard, 92 the tender years presumption 93 and the statutory equal
rights of parents, 94 the court focused its attention on joint custody
awards in other states 95 in order to determine which factors should be
considered in a disposition of this kind. 96 Two principles emerged.
First, the primary consideration must be the welfare and best interest
of the child and second, any determination must be based on the
particular facts of each case. 97 The Mayer court granted joint custody 98 because the children were of such an age that the arrangement
would not be harmful.9 9 Also, since the mother would be taking the
children out of the state, joint custody was the only reasonable alternative allowing the children to know and enjoy the father's love and
respect. 100

17

Id. at 568, 376 A.2d at 220.

11 Id. at 560, 376 A.2d at 216.
89

Id.

90 Id.
11 Id. at 561, 376 A.2d at 217 (construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp.
1982-1983)). See supra note 57 for text of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23. If joint custody, in the
particular circumstances, meets this standard the court has the authority to award it. 150 N.J.
Super. at 561, 376 A.2d at 217.
'2 150 N.J. Super. at 561-63, 376 A.2d at 217. See supra note 11 for discussion on best
interests standard.
03 150 N.J. Super. at 563-64, 376 A.2d at 218. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the tender years presumption.
91 150 N.J. Super. at 564-65, 376 A.2d at 218-19. See supra notes 46, 53-57 and accompanying text.
1s 150 N.J. Super. at 565-67, 376 A.2d at 219-20. The court noted that other states either
dislike the concept or "demonstrate . . . a guarded acceptance." Id. at 565, 376 A.2d at 219.
96 These factors include the parental wishes, the age of the child and the geographical
proximity of the parental homes. Id. at 566-67, 376 A.2d at 219.
97 Id. at 565, 376 A.2d at 219.
I1
Id. at 568, 376 A.2d at 220. The specific terms of the arrangement allowed the father
physical custody in July and August and the mother physical custody for the remainder of the
year. Id.
99 Id.
100Id.
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Mayer, a trial court decision, was an important step toward the
acceptance of joint custody as a possible alternative arrangement in
New Jersey. Nevertheless, the leading case is Beck v. Beck,' 0 ' decided
one year after Mayer, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court finally
endorsed the joint custody concept. 0 2 In Beck, the husband sought
liberal visitation rights of the couple's two adopted daughters. 0 3 The
trial court sua sponte ordered joint legal and physical custody. 0 4 The
mother opposed the decree and a plenary hearing was ordered on the
custody issue. 105 The trial court again awarded joint custody 106 but the
holding was reversed on appeal. 07 Due to the novelty and importance
of the issues, 10 the supreme court granted certification. 0 9
Citing Mayer, the court found the judicial authority to decree
joint custody.1 0 The court relied on N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 which
gives the court broad discretion in making such awards"' and N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4 which indicates that both parents should remain
2
fully involved with their children after a divorce."
The Beck court adopted a definition of joint custody which was
comprised of two elements, legal custody and physical custody." 3 The
legal component encompasses the sharing of legal responsibility and
authority for all major decisions concerning the child. "4 The physical
component of the definition entails a logistical arrangement of sharing

10186 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
102 Id. at 488-89, 432 A.2d at 67.
103 Id. at 488, 432 A.2d at 67.
104 Id. at 489, 432 A.2d at 67.
105 Id.
101
107

Id. at 492, 432 A.2d at 68-69.
Id. at 494, 432 A.2d at 69. The appellate decision is reported at 173 N.J. Super. 33, 413

A.2d 350 (App. Div. 1980).
10886 N.J. at 485, 432 A.2d at 65.
100Beck v. Beck, 84 N.J. 451, 420 A.2d 348 (1980).
110 86 N.J. at 485, 432 A.2d at 65.
"I Id. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 "evinces a legislative intent to grant courts wide latitude to
fashion creative remedies in matrimonial custody cases." 86 N.J. at 485, 432 A.2d at 65. See
supra note 57 for text of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23.
112 86 N.J. at 485, 432 A.2d at 65. The relevant text of the statute reads:
In making an order or judgment relative to the custody of the children pending a
controversy between their parents, or in regard to their final possession, the rights of
both parents, in the absence of misconduct, shall be held to be equal, and they shall
be equally charged with their care, nurture, education and welfare, and the happiness and welfare of the children shall determine the custody or possession.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1976) (emphasis added).
13 86 N.J. at 486-87, 432 A.2d at 65-66.
"I Id. at 487, 432 A.2d at 66. The court distinguished legal from physical custody by
emphasizing that both parents share legal custody at all times. Id. (emphasis added).
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the child's companionship.1 5 The parent with physical custody is also
responsible for minor decisions affecting the child's daily activities." 6
Because in certain cases the arrangement could foster the child's best
17
interests, the court endorsed the joint custody alternative."
The Beck court proceeded to discuss the guidelines which must be
followed when joint custody is being considered as an alternative." 8
Initially a court must determine whether a relationship exists between
each of the parents and their child so that the child would profit from
a joint custody arrangement.11 9 Only after the court is satisfied that
the child would benefit from a continuing relationship with both
parents does the court consider the additional factors 20 such as
whether both parents are fit, willing to accept custody' 2' and potentially cooperative in child rearing matters. 122 When these factors are
not present, joint custody may not be appropriate. 123
An arrangement of joint physical custody, however, necessitates
12 5
additional considerations.1 24 A court must consider financial status
as well as the demands employment makes on each parent in order to
ensure the child's adequate care. 26 Proximity of the parental homes
must be examined to determine how it will affect the child's education
and relationship with friends and other family members. 27 Finally,
the number of children involved and their ages would affect the
court's decision. 128 Even if joint physical custody is adjudged imprac129
ticable joint legal custody should remain a possibility.

115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.

at 488, 432 A.2d at 66. The court declined to establish a presumption for any form of
custody because meticulous fact finding is necessary in every case. Id.
118 Id. at 497, 432 A.2d at 71.
119Id. The necessary relationship is characterized as one in which both parents are viewed by
the child as sources of love and security. Id. at 497-98, 432 A.2d at 71.
12o Id. at 498, 432 A.2d at 71.
12' Id. at 498, 432 A.2d at 71. The parents may be opposed to joint custody, but as long as
each individual parent is willing to accept custody, a joint arrangement is possible. Id.
122 Id. The parents need not like each other; the parents need only show the potential to
cooperate as parents regardless of their personal conflicts. Id. at 498, 432 A.2d at 71-72.
123 Id. at 497, 432 A.2d at 71.
124 Id. at 500, 432 A.2d at 72.
125 Id. See generally Patterson, The Added Cost of Sharing Lives, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 10 (1982).
126 86 N.J. at 500, 432 A.2d at 72.
127

Id.

Id. The court indicated that the impact these factors would have on a court's subsequent
determinations was not clear, therefore the court suggested that expert testimony be introduced
for each particular case. Id. One study suggests older children may need the stability and
continuity of one home. Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 327. Also, the negative effects of joint
custody may be heightened as the number of children involved increases. Id.
129 86 N.J. at 500, 432 A.2d at 72-73.
128
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The inappropriateness of joint custody was evident in Mastropole
v. Mastropole 30 in which a chancery court order, modifying a divorce
judgment to require joint custody, was reversed 131 on the ground that
132
the child did not have the requisite relationship with his father.
Moreover, the parents had not demonstrated the potential to cooperate in matters relating to their son. 133 Under these circumstances, the
appellate division found that the Beck criteria for a joint custody
award had not been met. 134 Since Beck, the Mastropole decision has
been virtually the only application and discussion of the joint custody
issue in the New Jersey courts. 135
III.

DISCUSSION

The Beck court's endorsement of joint custody 13 has not ended
judicial hesitation in considering this type of custody arrangement
even when parental agreement leads to a request for joint custody. 13
Moreover, the tender years presumption 138 continues to be a factor in
custody determinations despite the statutory equal rights of parents. 139
In response to this situation, legislation has been introduced in the
New Jersey Senate to clarify state policy in the custody area. 1,40
130181 N.J. Super. 130, 436 A.2d 955 (App. Div. 1981).
131Id. at 142, 436 A.2d at 961.
132 Id. at 137-38, 436 A.2d at 959-60. The child wished to remain with his mother and was
ambivalent toward his father. Id. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
133 181 N.J. Super. at 138, 436 A.2d at 960. The parents had a history of using their son as a
pawn in their disagreements. Id.
134181 N.J. Super. at 137, 430 A.2d at 959. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
135The lack of reported cases has been attributed to the nature of joint custody. Bratt, supra
note 6, at 284. Shared custody is most often awarded when the parents request the arrangement.
Id. Reported cases result from continued disagreement and uncooperative parenting. Folberg &
Graham, supra note 10, at 540.
Joint custody was under consideration in one other recent New Jersey case. The parties
assumed they would have joint custody of their children until a pre-trial conference revealed
significant disagreement as to the financial support of the children. Fehnel v. Fehnel, 186 N.J.
Super. 209, 212, 452 A.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 1982). Since custody had become an issue, the
wife's attorney requested an adjournment for a probation investigation, family evaluations and
arrangement for expert testimony. Id. at 212-13, 452 A.2d at 210-11. The trial judge denied the
adjournment, by the appellate division found this was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 214, 452
A.2d at 211. The continuation of the trial under the circumstances could not foster the best
interests of the children. See id. at 215, 452 A.2d at 212.
13' See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
"'

COMMISSION ON SEx DISCRIMINATION IN THE STATUTES,

SEX DISCRIMINATION IN MARRIAGE

AND FAMILY LAW, SECOND REPORT 6 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SECOND REPORT].
131 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
139 SECOND REPORT, supra note 137, at 6. See supra notes 46 & 53-57 and accompanying text.
140 See S. 598, supra note 12. The legislative history states that each case should be decided on

an individual basis. SECOND REPORT, supra note 137, at 7. The best interests standard remains
"the guiding principle." Id.
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Senate Bill 598 provides the judiciary with three options when
faced with a custody decision. 4 ' The courts are empowered to award
joint legal and physical custody, 42 joint legal and sole physical custody 143 or sole legal and physical custody with visitation rights for the
noncustodial parent. 44 The bill also retains the statutory mandate
that each parent shall have an equal right to the custody of his or her
child.

45

The proposed legislation sets out several factors to be examined
when considering a custody alternative. 4 The factors include, inter
alia, parental wishes and ability to cooperate in childrearing matters,
parental fitness, family relationships, and the child's needs and preferences. 14 Additional factors are considered when physical custody is
being assessed, including the proximity of parental homes, the par-

The proposed legislation states:
In any proceeding involving the custody of a minor child, the rights of both parents
shall be equal and the court shall enter an order awarding either:
a. Joint custody of a minor child to both parents, with an equitable sharing of living
experience in time and physical care, except joint legal custody may be awarded
without joint physical custody. The court shall order joint custody when it is
requested by both parents unless it is contrary to the best interests of the child; or
b. Legal and physical custody to one parent with appropriate visitation for the
noncustodial parent.
In making an award of custody, the court shall consider various factors, including
parental desire for joint custody; the parents' ability to agree, communicate and
cooperate in matters relating to the child; the interaction and relationship of the
child with its parents and siblings; the safety of the child and the safety of either
parent from physical abuse by the other parent; the preference of the child when of
sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision; the needs
of the child; the stability of the home environment offered; the quality and continuity of the child's education; and the fitness of the parents. A parent shall not be
deemed unfit unless the parent's conduct has a direct adverse effect on the child.
The court, in determining the physical custody element of a joint custody award,
shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors: the geographical proximity of the parents' homes, the financial resources of the parents, their employment
responsibilities and the age and number of the children.
S. 598, supra note 12, at 2-3.
42 Id. at 2. The statute does not provide a definition for the various custody options which are
authorized.
143 Id.
'44 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 2-3.
141 Id. The statutory definition of unfitness relates only to parental conduct which "has a
direct adverse effect on the child." Id. at 3. This definition is a departure from earlier case law
which defined the statutory meaning of misconduct. Grove v. Grove, 21 N.J. Super. 447, 91
A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1952). " 'Misconduct,' as used in the statute (R.S. 9:2-4, as amended by L.
1948, c. 321), means such conduct as to deprive the parent of a moral right to the child's
custody." Id. at 454, 91 A.2d at 367.
14
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demands and the
ents' financial means, the parents' employment
48
number and ages of the children involved.
As an initial attempt to deal with a complex social problem, the
proposed legislation is adequate. The bill does not create a preference' 49 or presumption 5 0 for any one form of custody and it does not
define any one of the options. The judiciary is thus permitted to retain
its broad discretion,' 5' allowing it to be creative in structuring the
specific arrangement. 15 2 Ideally, this flexibility will result in a custody
53
determination tailored to the needs of the child and the parents.'
The term joint custody should reflect the idea of a sharing of parenting time and responsibility; joint custody need not be limited to rigidly
symmetrical divisions of time and authority.' 54 Instead, the actual
55
arrangement may take any practicable form the family desires.'
The Commission report on Senate Bill 598 indicates that the Beck
ruling was based on its unique facts.' 56 As a result, it is possible that
joint custody would have only limited application.' 57 Although the
Beck court did "perceive that the necessary elements [for an award of
joint custody] will coalesce only infrequently," 58 the decision itself
was never expressly limited to its facts. In light of this confusion, the
proposed legislation clarifies the state policy on custody and allows all
custody options to be considered on an equal basis.1 59

18
S. 598, supra note 12, at 3. These are the same considerations the Beck court recognized as
important. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
141 Several states have enacted statutes providing for a joint custody "preference."
See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West Cum. Supp. 1982). Preference statutes allow joint
custody to be the first alternative considered. Schulman, Who's Looking After the Children?, 5
FAM. ADVOC. 31,33 (1982).
110The statutes of Florida and Idaho provide that joint custody be the presumed arrangement
in the absence of compelling reasons for the award of another form of custody. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.13 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (Cum. Supp. 1982).
15 See supra note 61 accompanying text.
152 The phrase "joint custody" evokes a range of expectations and objectives among involved
parties. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. By not imposing a standard definition, the
custody decree can provide for as much or as little involvement in time-sharing and decisionmaking as each parent desires. See Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1540-41. On the other
hand, the Beck definition, see supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text, provides the courts
with some direction when formulating a custody plan.
s' The best interests of the child is a product of and dependent on the best interests of the
family. Folberg & Graham, supra note 10, at 553.
l1 Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1541. In its recommendations the Pashman Committee advised that "joint participation in child raising does not necessarily mean that an equal
amount of time must be spent with each parent .... " FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
153 See Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1541.
156 SECOND REPORT, supra note 137, at 7.
157

Id.

SS 86 N.J. at 497, 432 A.2d at 71.
'59

SECOND REPORT,

supra note 137, at 7.
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Joint custody is fashionable at the present time.6 0 The concept
has, as an important feature, an inherent continuing parent-child
relationship; consequently, the arrangement has been considered as
the preferred alternative by some states.' 16 Yet at least one study
suggests that joint custody, rather than being better or worse, is only
equally as desirable as other custody options. 6 2 In order for a joint
custody arrangement to be effective, each parent must want the child
to preserve the relationship with the other parent. 6 3 The parents must
want to be actively involved in the child's upbringing. 6 4 Both parents
are obliged to communicate and cooperate with each other with
regard to the child's concerns. 6 5 There must be a high level of commitment toward maintaining the arrangement.'
Additionally, the
parents must abide by the negotiated guidelines encompassing both
practical logistics and matters of control and authority. 16 Clearly,
joint custody demands considerable effort on the part of the parents.168 A joint custody scheme involves numerous considerations,
therefore making it difficult to predict in which situations it will be
successful. 169
To reach a rational decision, the parents should be apprised of all
custody options. 70 The optimal setting for a custody determination
would allow the parents, their attorneys and court-appointed behavioral scientists'' to meet, assess the family's situation and decide
17 2
which option best suits the family and their particular objectives.
"[T]he great potential of the trained psychiatrist, psychologist and
social worker in aiding the court in resolving delicate issues of child
custody," has been recognized by the New Jersey Committee on Mat-

E.g., Gardner, supra note 11, at 46.
See supra notes 149 & 150; cJ. Greif, supra note 6, at 319; see also, e.g., Taussig &
Carpenter, supra note 6, at 234 (proposing a statutory presumption for joint custody).
1'2Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 328. The arrangement "works under certain conditions." Id.
But cf. Gardner, supra note 11, at 46 (when successful, joint custody provides maximum
protection from damages divorce can cause).
M6Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 325-26.
164 Folberg & Graham, supra note 10, at 579.
'15 Mills & Belzer, Joint Custody As A ParentingAlternative, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 853, 869,
872 (1982).
' Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 325-26.
167 Id.
161Mills & Belzer, supra note 165, at 869; see also Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 326-27.
"I Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1542.
170 Id.
171 The employment of court-appointed professionals allows the state retain its parens patriae
interest in the welfare of the child. See supra note 60.
172 See Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1542-43.
161
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rimonial Litigation (Pashman Committee). 173 Behavioral scientists
with expertise in the custody determination area will have the ability
to educate the parties and help them reach a mutually acceptable
decision to realize their goals and expectations. 174 It has, in fact, been
stated by the Pashman Committee that "[t]he use of professionals
to resolve their problems is . . . an
trained to assist family members
75
idea whose time has come." 1
A mediation approach to custody determinations is particularly
beneficial when joint custody is the form chosen by the parents. Joint
custody appears to be most successful when parents themselves develop the arrangement. 176 The court's role in this process would primarily be advisory such as appointing and supervising the required
professionals. Ultimately, however, the court would have the responsibility of approving the final custody plan. Surprisingly, mediation of
this type is not addressed by Senate Bill 598. 177 Legislation is necessary
to provide for such a mediation process 178 because it provides the
opportunity and potential for "fashioning ways to create a cooperative
and conciliatory environment for the benefit of parents and children." 179
An additional benefit of mediation for all custody options is the
opportunity for the preservation of family autonomy. Parents have a
constitutionally protected right to make decisions concerning the

171 FINAL REPORT,

supra note 4, at 7.
See Benedek & Benedek, supra note 6, at 1542-43; cf. Ilfield, supra note 22, at 66 (mental
health professionals can help meet needs of family through development of plan). New Jersey
judges have employed trained psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers to assist in the
custody decision. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
171

1v5

FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.

Mills & Belzer, supra note 165, at 874.
171 It should be noted that the Pashman Committee endorsed the mediation approach. FINAL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
178 California has already provided for a mediation process through legislation. California
Civil Code § 4607 became effective January 1, 1981. The statute provides:
Section 4607(a): Where it appears on the face of the petition or other application for
an order or modification of an order for the custody or visitation of a child or
children that either or both such issues are contested, . . . the matter shall be set for
mediation of the contested issues prior to or concurrent with the setting of the matter
for hearing. The purpose of such mediation proceeding shall be to reduce acrimony
which may exist between the parties and to develop an agreement assuring the child
or children's close and continuing contact with both parents after the marriage is
dissolved. The mediator shall use his or her best efforts to effect a settlement of the
custody or visitation dispute.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1981).
119FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
'
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child's needs and living arrangements. 80 Upon institution of a divorce
action, the state makes these decisions.18 ' By employing a mediation
format, however, the state will not automatically intrude into family
decisions by determining custody. Instead, the family will have the
ability to decide its future with professional help and guidance.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Beck decision and the proposed Senate legislation indicate
that the concept of joint custody has state approval as an alternative in
New Jersey custody actions. Nevertheless, further long and short term
research is necessary to ascertain when joint custody is, in fact, a
realistic alternative. Legislative consideration of the mediation process
for custody determination should be pursued as a further safeguard of
a child's welfare in the wake of a parental divorce.
New Jersey has taken a responsible approach in refusing to create
a presumption or preference for the increasingly popular joint custody
alternative. Allowing all custody options to be considered equally is
most conducive to serving the child's best interests.
Janet L. Spies

180The parent-child relationship is entitled to constitutional protection from intrusion by the
state. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). Prior to a divorce, states rarely intrude into
the affairs of the intact family. Bratt, supra note 6, at 293. State intrusion into the parent-child
relationship is only justified when a legitimate state purpose exists. Id. at 291. This is normally
limited to instances of abuse or neglect. Id. at 293. See generally id. at 288-95.
"I' See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). For the text of this statute
see supra note 57.

